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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 3.3(a)(3) [alternatively, the "Rule"] of the Model Rules of Professional

Conduct [hereinafter MRPC], entitled "Candor Toward the Tribunal," warns
that- "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly
2
adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel."
The MRPC was drafted in 1977 by a committee appointed by the president of
the American Bar Association [hereinafter ABA] and approved in 1983 by the
policy-making body of the ABA, the House of Delegates. 3 So far, about
1

Associate Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center. I would like to thank my colleagues Lundy Langston, Elena Marty-Nelson and
John Sanchez for their helpful and insightful comments on earlier drafts. Research
assistance was provided by Anne-Marie Clark, Hellen Bryan and Natalie Anderson,
Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.
2
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983).
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thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted all or part of the
MRPC, with or without alterations, as the code of ethics governing lawyers'
behavior.4 The MRPC is written in "restatement" format. In this regard, each of
the individual Model Rules frames both a black letter rule, which is obligatory,
and a commentary which aids in interpretation of the rule. 5
The conceptual underpinning for Rule 3.3(a)(3) stems from an adversarial
judicial system where the best decision is achieved when the court is made
aware of all of the legal premises and authorities that apply to a particular
dispute. 6 Accordingly, a party in a legal action is not entitled to benefit from an
opponent's failure to reveal legal authority found by the opponent that is
damaging to its position. Moreover, with all parties before the tribunal bound
by the same ethical obligation, the tribunal may rest assured that it has access
to all relevant law when the time comes for rendering a decision, thus serving
the ends of justice.
This article analyzes Rule 3.3(a)(3) and its implications for opposing parties
in an adversarial legal system. The article's conclusion is that strict compliance
with Rule 3.3(a)(3) by all members of the Bar is necessary to preserve the
integrity of the legal system. Circumvention of the Rule is a disservice to the
legal system. Part II explains Rule 3.3(a)(3) so that lawyers can grasp the ethical
duty owed. Part III examines three roles simultaneously played by a lawyer: a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a private citizen
having a special responsibility for the quality of justice.7 Part III also portrays
how Rule 3.3(a)(3) raises a conflict among these roles. Part IV analyzes the
adversarial legal system against the backdrop of Rule 3.3(a)(3). Finally, Part V
explains how the adversarial system sorts out the conflict in roles lawyers face
in light of Rule 3.3(a)(3). In addition, Part V suggests the addition of clarifying
language to the commentary of Rule 3.3(a)(3) to make it more effective.
II. RULE 3.3(a)(3)
A. Ethical Forerunners
Rule 3.3(a)(3) can be traced back to the Canons of Professional Ethics
[hereinafter CPE], published by the ABA in 1908. The CPE served as the ABA's
first code of ethics for attorneys. 8 Canon 22 of the CPE, entitled "Candor and
Fairness," reads in part: "[t]he conduct of the lawyers before the Court and with

4

1d. at xvi.

5

THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 12 (5th ed. 1991).
6

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 3.3 cmt. (1983). "The underlying
concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises
properly applicable to the case." Id. at cmt. 3.
7

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr pmbl. (1983).

8

MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 5, at 11.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss2/5

2

1995]

DUTY TO DISCLOSE DAMAGING LEGAL AUTHORITY

305

other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness."9 While Canon
22 does not explicitly state that attorneys owe a duty to disclose damaging legal
authority to the tribunal, subsequent formal opinions issued by the ABA
Committee on Ethics make clear that the drafters of the CPE envisioned that
lawyers would be so bound. 10 In Formal Opinion 146, the ABA Committee on
Ethics ruled that Canon 22 forces a lawyer to disclose decisions damaging to
his case which are known to him but unknown to his adversary.11
In 1969, the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
[hereinafter MCPR], a forerunner of the MRPC. 12 In short order, virtually every
state adopted some version of the MCPR.13 The MCPR consists of three parts:
canons, which serve as chapter headings; ethical considerations, which are
14
aspirational in nature; and disciplinary rules, which are obligatory. The
MRPC replaced the MCPR as the ethical code regulating attorney conduct in a
majority of the states15 for reasons unrelated to the question of a lawyer's
candor toward the tribunal. The MCPR was replaced, in part, because it did
not adequately address the obligations owed by lawyers practicing in large
firms or reflect the many tasks performed by lawyers. For example, the MCPR
did not fully address the ethical questions lawyers face when serving as
16
negotiators.
However, Disciplinary Rule 7-106(B)(1) of the MCPR and Rule 3.3(a)(3) are
virtually identical. Under Disciplinary Rule 7-106(B)(1) of the MCPR, "[i]n
presenting a matter to the tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose: [llegal authority in
the controlling jurisdiction known to him to be directly adverse to the position
of his client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel."17 Because of the
similarity of the language of the two rules, cases interpreting and applying the
Disciplinary Rule bear some weight in analyzing the Model Rule.

9

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 22 (1908).

10The Committee on Ethics is one of the standing committees of the American Bar
Association. The committee's tasks include rendering opinions on proper professional
conduct for lawyers and assisting bar associations, courts, committees, etc. in
interpreting the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Policy and ProceduresHandbook
(American Bar Association) 1982-1983 at 26.
11ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 146 (1935).
12

GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 3, at 409.

13

/d.

14

MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 5.

5

1 GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 3, at 409.
16

A New Ethics Code: ABA Adopts Model Rules of Professional Conduct (ABA Annual
Report 1982-1983) ABA Journal, Jan. 1984, at 13-14.
17

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B)(1) (1981).
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B. "A Lawyer Shall Not Knowingly Fail to Disclose to the Tribunal"
Rule 3.3(a) outlines what a lawyer shall not "knowingly" do. In the MRPC,
the word "knowingly" refers to actual knowledge. 18 Actual knowledge is,
technically, subjective-what a particular lawyer knows in reality, not what he
should have known. Whether or not a lawyer has actual knowledge may be
inferred from the circumstances, thereby turning a subjective standard into one

that may be objectively measured.1 9 For instance, courts have disciplined

lawyers for failing to reveal cases that are brought to light by shepardizing the
cases cited by the lawyer.20 Thus, the legal authority a lawyer actually knows
often includes authority that a court says a lawyer should know.
Rule 3.3(a)(3) also details what a lawyer shall not knowingly "fail to disclose
to the tribunal."2 1 "Tribunal" is a term left undefined by the MRPC. A tribunal
22
has been described as a body before which trial-type proceedings are held.
Trial-type proceedings include those in which parties present evidence, where
witnesses are examined, and where neutral decision-makers render decisions
based on the strength of evidence and arguments developed in the
proceeding. 23 The MCPR defines a tribunal as all courts and all their
adjudicatory bodies.24 Under this definition, bank regulatory agencies 25 and
the Internal Revenue Service 26 are not tribunals to which a duty of disclosure
is owed under Rule 3.3(a)(3). This conclusion seems appropriate given that
such agencies do not profess to be "unprejudiced and unbiased in the judicial
sense."2 7 A similar duty may be owed in such administrative proceedings,

18

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Terminology (1983).

191d.

20Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
rev'd 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986). The district court, in its opinion sanctioning counsel
for violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, also discussed counsel's duty under
the Rule. The imposition of sanctions was subsequently reversed by the Court of
Appeals. "For counsel to have been unaware of those cases means that they did not
Shepardize their principal authority." Id. at 129. See also, Spangler v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 752 F. Supp. 1437, 1447 (S.D. Ind.1990) ("[diefendants' counsel's failure to locate
controlling authority and bring it to the attention of this court and his intransigence in
adhering to his incorrect legal opinion in the face of contrary controlling authority could
lead this court to conclude that defendants' counsel was less than diligent in the effort
he made to adhere to the Rules of Professional Conduct.").
21 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983).
22

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 375 (1993).

23

1d.

24

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Definitions (1982).

25

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 375 (1993).

26

ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965).

27

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 375 (1993).
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however, pursuant to Model Rule 3.9, "Advocate in Nonadjudicative
29
Proceedings"28 or Model Rule 4.1, "Truthfulness in Statements to Others."
Two knotty questions over the interpretation and application of Rule
3.3(a)(3) linger after the terms "knowingly" and "tribunal" have been defined.
First, what is legal authority from a controlling jurisdiction; and second, when
is legal authority directly adverse to a client's position?
C. "Legal Authorityfrom a ControllingJurisdiction"
An advocate's duty to disclose directly adverse legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction under Rule 3.3(a)(3) seems to be an outgrowth of the
drafters' commitment to the principle of stare decisis. Stare decisis is a doctrine
of repose by which courts are bound when deciding cases. Rather than creating
new law each time a legal issue is raised, courts owe a duty to decide30 issues
against the backdrop of principles established in earlier, similar cases.
Stare decisis accomplishes a number of worthwhile goals. The doctrine
reinforces a court's image as an impartial arbiter because the outcome in a
particular case stems not from the pet impulses of the decision-maker, but from
a respected body of law.31 The doctrine of stare decisis also makes for speedier
decisions since the decision-maker need only apply existing authority and need
32
not reinvent the wheel each time it decides a case. The doctrine also fosters
the impression that the legal system is stable and predictable so that parties
who have couched their dealings in reliance on well-entrenched law need not
33
fear a "bolt from the blue."
Despite its importance to decision-makers, stare decisis raises certain
concerns. Stare decisis may block urgent innovation. In his dissent in Bowers v.
Hardwick, Justice Blackmun, citing Justice Holmes, wrote:
I believe that [it] is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished

28
"A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or administrative tribunal in a
nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative
capacity and shall conform to the provisions of Rules 3.3(a) through (c), and 3.5." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.9 (1983).
29
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(a) (1983) ("In the course of
representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person....").
3020 AM. JUR. 2D Costs-Covenants §§ 183, 191 (1965).

31B.CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS 34, 112 (1921).
32

THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING
IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 131 (1978).
33

1d.
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long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past.34
Blind adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis may render decision-makers
reluctant to revisit a law's moorings even when times radically change.
Comment 3 makes clear that Rule 3.3(a)(3) serves to ensure that "the legal
premises properly applicable to the case" are discussed. 35 Above all, Rule
3.3(a)(3) instructs an advocate to disclose to the tribunal legal authority that the
tribunal should take into account before fulfilling its duty under stare decisis.
Simply put, Rule 3.3(a)(3) mandates disclosure of law bearing precedential
weight. While a tribunal might find a particular authority useful, the advocate
owes no obligation to disclose such authority under Rule 3.3(a)(3) unless the
authority can serve as precedent. Rule 3.3(a)(3) dictates disclosure of cases
decided by the same court or higher courts in the same jurisdiction which
interpreted and applied a rule of law to a fact pattern which resembled the case
in question and which posed similar legal issues, if those decisions (1) run
counter to the position of the advocate; (2) are known to the advocate; and (3)
are not brought to light by opposing counsel. Although an advocate does not
subject herself to professional discipline for failing to disclose extra
jurisdictional authority, she nevertheless may draw criticism from the bench
36
for failing to follow the "spirit of the law" governing disclosure of authority.
While those cases may well be persuasive, strictly speaking they bear no
37
precedential weight.
Under Rule 3.3(a)(3), advocates also owe a duty to disclose controlling
statutory authority38 and agency regulations 39 since they often have the same
practical effect as cases. Counsel violates the spirit, if not the letter, of Rule
3.3(a)(3) when one fails to disclose rulings she participated in addressing
virtually identical issues by courts in other jurisdictions. 40 While such decisions
41
bear no precedntial weight, failure to disclose them may lead to sanctions.

34

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.3 cmt. (1983).
3620 AM. JUR. 2D Costs-Covenants§ 203 (1965).
35

37

1d. at § 191 (1965).

38

See Dorso Trailer Sales v. American Body & Trailer, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 551, 557
(Minn. App. 1990) affd in part and rev'd in part, 482 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1990) ("counsel's
failure to disclose the good cause requirement of chapter 80E, Minn. Stat. § 80.06 subd.
1(c) ...
clearly formed the basis for the district court's finding that counsel made a
grievous mistake").
39
SeeIn re Slodov 79-1 T.C. 9215 n.12 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1979), vacated sub. nom United
States v. Slodov, 675 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1982) (government's failure to disclose manual
containing authority that might have decisive influence upon a disputed issue "did not
accord with the spirit of [DR 7-106(B)]").
40Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 832, 845 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
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D. -Directly Adverse to the Position of the Client and not Disclosed by Opposing
Counsel "
Only "directly adverse" legal authority triggers the duty to disclose.
Attorneys naturally balk at the notion that they owe a duty to disclose or raise
claims or theories not advanced by their adversaries. 42 However, neither the
MRPC nor the MCPR explain what is meant by "directly adverse." In a footnote
to Disciplinary Rule 7-106(B)(1), the drafters refer to ABA Opinion 280.4 3 The
footnotes, according to the CPE, "are not intended to be an annotation of the
views taken by [the drafters]."44 In ABA Opinion 280, the Committee on
Professional Ethics found that the duty to disclose embraces not only
authorities that squarely settle the pending case, but also any "decision directly
adverse to any proposition of law on which the lawyer expressly relies, which
would reasonably be considered important by the judge sitting on the case."45
In this regard, even if a court ruling can be read in a number of ways, if one
construction is directly adverse to the lawyer's client, the duty to disclose
arises. 46
In sum, this segment of the rule instructs an advocate, at the very least, to
disclose any legal authority that on its face raises a possibility that the
advocate's client should not prevail, either ultimately or on a particular issue.
This duty to disclose under Rule 3.3(a)(3) does not force an advocate to admit
defeat in the face of damaging authority.
III. AN ATrORNEY'S MANY HATS
According to the MRPC's preamble, a lawyer is "a representative of clients,
an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special responsibility
for the quality of justice."47 Lawyers and judges have bandied these terms back
and forth, but their meanings, especially regarding the duty to disclose under
Rule 3.3(a)(3), are far from clear. Given the common understanding of the terms
and the obligations imposed by the MRPC, the lawyer's various roles seem
headed on a collision course. For example, while an attorney who comes
forward with adverse legal authority from a controlling jurisdiction may
appear loyal to the court and the legal system, her fidelity to her client, at least

41

Id. ('Decisions in the district court in Florida are not controlling in this Court, so

Medtronic's behavior was not a violation of the letter of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, but it is a clear violation of its spirit. Repetition of such dubious behavior
is likely to result in the imposition of sanctions by this Court.").
42

Dorso TrailerSales, 464 N.W.2d at 557.

43

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106, note 79 (1981).

44

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl., note 1 (1981).

45

ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 280 (1949).

46

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1505 (1984).

47

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr pmbl. (1983).
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in her client's mind may be cast in doubt as the client may not understand why
her attorney is disclosing damaging law. This raises a question regarding the
merits of Rule 3.3(a)(3).
A. Representativeof Clients
On the surface, a lawyer's role as a client's representative seems easy enough
to define. As the MRPC points out, a lawyer in her role as a representative of
clients acts as a legal advisor, advocate, negotiator, intermediary, and
evaluator.48 The foregoing list, however, merely outlines some of the tasks
assigned the lawyer as an agent. It does not fully describe what that role
consists of.
The image of the attorney as a client's agent is sometimes cast as the
"lawyer-as-hired-gun."49 As the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
To many, the lawyer is a mere extension of the will of the client. The
client wishes to pursue certain ends but is without technical, legal
skills. The lawyer provides those skills. He is in a sense a conduit
through which the client pursues his ends. The lawyer at once is both
highly partisan and completely neutral. He aggressively pursues the
ends. 50
ends of his client, yet he remains personally indifferent to those
Couched in these terms, the lawyer is simply and solely the client's agent.
The lawyer performs at the behest of the client without ideally adding any
prejudices to the relationship. 51 Others dismiss the image of
lawyer-as-hired-gun.
In the client-and-attorney relation the client is not a master, the lawyer
is not a mere hired hand - he is an officer of the court, with a duty of
independent judgment in the performance of his professional
52 service
and under a duty to serve all sorts and conditions of men.
roles, and
This view recognizes that lawyers play multiple and interlocking
53
that one role cannot be singled out at the expense of others.
48

Id.

49

THOMAs L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1994).
50

Thornton v. Breland, 441 So.2d 1348, 1350 (Miss. 1983).

51 This perspective has also been described as libertarian. A lawyer who adopts this
approach believes it her duty to pursue any legal objective of the client. See William H.
Simon, Ethical DiscretionIn Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
52 Justice Robert H. Jackson, The American Bar Center: A Testimony to OurFaith in the

Rule of Law, 40 A.B.A.J. 19,21 (1954).
53

"Most lawyers would probably admit that the hired gun approach, in its most
uncompromising form, has never been and should not be the actual tradition of the legal
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The lawyer, as an agent of clients, has also been likened to the
"lawyer-as-guru."54 As such, the client looks to the lawyer to chart the proper
course of action, and the lawyer brings to bear all her professional skills in
laying the course to pursue.5 5 The lawyer-as-guru has few guideposts along
the way: "The lawyer should take those actions that, considering the relevant
56
circumstances of the particular case, seem most likely to promote justice."
Before a lawyer takes those actions that promote justice, however, he or she
must understand what justice is and convey this theory of justice to the client
for his consideration.
A third, informal view depicts the lawyer as a friend to her client. 57 After
bonding with the client, the lawyer acts in the best interests of the client and
effectively adopts the client's interests as her own. 58 Often, the lawyer's role
goes beyond merely helping the client-friend achieve a particular legal goal.
The lawyer may also counsel the client on moral, as well as, non-legal issues
raised by the case. 59
No matter how one portrays the role of a lawyer as a representative of clients,
it is universally recognized that the lawyer should "act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client's behalf." 60 However, even zeal can go too far. "[A] lawyer is not bound
to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A lawyer has
professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be
pursued."6 1 A lawyer's defense of "I did it for my client," cuts no ice in a
disciplinary proceeding, since an attorney's legal maneuverings are confined
by codes of ethics among other law.62 A lawyer cannot rely on "I did it in the
best interest of my client" if that means that she acted unprofessionally for the
sake of her client. In short, a lawyer cannot bend ethical rules in the name of
winning her case.

profession." W. William Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, The Kutak Rules,
and the Trial Lawyer's Code: Surprisingly,Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 739, 747
(1981).
54

SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 49, at 3.

55Id.
56 Simon, supra note 51, at 1090.
57

SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 49, at 4.

58 Id.
59
See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060,1088 (1986).

60MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983).
61

id.

62

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1983). "Many of a lawyer's

professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well
as substantive and procedural law." Id.
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Given the competing schools of thought regarding the nature of the lawyer's
role as an advocate of clients, lawyers may find common ground on the tasks
a lawyer performs, yet disagree on how those tasks should be performed. For
example, Rule 1.2(c), entitled "Scope of Representation," notes that "[a] lawyer
may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after
consultation."63 The amount of information that a lawyer will share with her
client in the course of consultation relates to the lawyer's sense of her role. A
lawyer who sees herself as her client's friend will likely share more information
with her client than the lawyer who sees herself as her client's hired gun. Both
lawyers, although probably conveying different information, arguably are
complying with the duty outlined in Rule 1.2(c). Because of the objective nature
of the rule, there remains room for a reasonably prudent lawyer to frame her
role as either friend or guru.
B. Officer of the Legal System
A second role played by lawyers is "officer of the legal system" or "officer of
the court."64 This role implies that while a lawyer serves a client, she owes a
duty to and shares a bond with a third party. This bond resembles an agency
relationship with the court serving as principal and the lawyer as agent. The
question then arises-where lies a lawyer's primary allegiance? The answer is
far from clear. When push comes to shove, the lawyer's primary allegiance may
well be owed to the court:
[aittomeys are officers of the court and their first duty is to the
administration of justice. Whenever an attorney's duties to his client
conflict with those he owes to the public as an officer of the court, he
must give precedence to his duty to the public. Any other view would
.65
run counter to a principled system of justice.
However, the duty owed by a lawyer to her client and to the legal system may
be on an equal footing: "the bar have great liberty and high privileges in the
assertion of their clients' rights as they view them, but, on the other hand, they
have equal obligations as officers in the administration of justice."66
When a lawyer finds herself caught in a bind over clashing allegiances owed
to court and client, the scales must tilt toward the court. Times where the

63

MODEL RULESOFPROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.2(c) (1983). According to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Terminology (1983), a consultation is the
"communication of information reasonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate
the significance of the matter in question." Id.
64MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr pmbl. (1983); see also Eugene R. Gaetke,
Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 41 (1989). Note 7 states "[t]here is
some variance in the terminology used to identify the characterization of lawyers as
officers of the court." Id.
65

Van Berkel v. Fox Farm, 581 F. Supp 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984).

66

In re Scouten, 40 A. 481 (Pa. 1898).
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lawyer's duty owed to the court trumps loyalty to the client range far and
wide.6 7 On the most obvious level, an attorney may never be a party to conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice. 68 Specifically, a lawyer must forego
communicating with a party who is represented by counsel without that
counsel's consent.69 Moreover, it is wrong for a lawyer to mislead a person
unrepresented by counsel over the lawyer's role in a matter.70 In addition, a
lawyer owes a duty to take reasonable remedial measures after learning that
she has introduced false evidence. 71
C. PrivateCitizen
Alawyer's third role is that of a private citizen having a special responsibility
for the quality of justice. 72 This role imposes responsibilities on the lawyer
which reach beyond the representation of a single client in an isolated legal
matter. A lawyer "should seek improvement of the law, the administration of
justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession." 73 This role
recognizes that "[t]he practice of law is not a craft or trade; it is a profession
whose main purpose is to aid in the doing of justice according to law between
the state and the individual and between man and man."74 Amid many duties
and while vigorously pursuing her client's interests and fulfilling her
obligations owed to the legal system, a lawyer must be mindful of the
impression she leaves on the public at large.
While the duty owed the public shapes yet another agency relationship for
the attorney, the nature of this bond resembles an arm's length embrace. Apart
from the duty owed to her client and to the court, the lawyer owes a "public"
duty to serve the ends of justice. In light of this public dimension of a lawyer's
duty, states commonly screen out members of the bar who fall short of a good
moral character.75 This public role of the "lawyer-as-citizen" accounts for the

67

Gaetke, supra note 63, at 62-63. These obligations, according to one scholar, are
vague, seldom enforced, or narrow in their application, or serve primarily lawyer's
interests while merely appearing to further the interests of society or the judiciary
system." Id. at 76.
68

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 8.4(d) (1983).

69

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 4.2 (1983).

70

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 4.3 (1983).

71

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983).

72

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1983).

73

Id.

74

Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee, 165 A. 211, 213 (1933).

75Justice Frankfurter observed that "[fIrom a profession charged with such
responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truthspeaking, of a high sense
of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that
have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as 'moral character."'
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practice in some jurisdictions entitling a private citizen with no lawyer-client
relationship with the lawyer to raise disciplinary claims against the lawyer.76
These states recognize that the public, apart from the lawyer's client or the legal

system, suffers when a lawyer commits unprofessional acts. 77 As an
independent check on the legal profession, a member of the public may set in
78
motion disciplinary proceedings to curb unethical lawyers.
D. Conflicting Roles

What does Rule 3.3(a)(3) have to say about the three interlocking,
overlapping roles lawyers play when ethical duties clash? Why should a
lawyer, acting for her client, have to weaken her case by turning over legal
authority. To be sure, a court ought to be fully informed before rendering a
decision on the merits. It appears that a lawyer is obligated to ensure that the

court has all of the binding applicable law when rendering a decision, even
when the weight of opposing authority leaves the lawyer with an uphill battle
on her hands. 79 After all, the lawyer is an officer of the legal system. What is
more, as a public citizen, a lawyer apparently owes a special responsibility for
the quality of justice and must realize that the best result for the public at large
80
may end up hurting her individual client. In some instances the conscientious
lawyer, juggling irreconcilable ethical demands, is tempted to throw up her
hands in frustration. Such frustrations must be addressed in order to guarantee
that both the public and clients are treated fairly. The legal system owes its
members a road map out of this ethical thicket.

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232,247(1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
76
See, John A. Weiss, The DisciplinarySystem in FloridaLegal Ethics § 2-7 (THE FLA. BAR
- CONTNUING LEGAL EDUC. 1992). "There are no standing requirements for filing a
complaint against a lawyer. The Bar will process complaints from disinterested parties
and from adverse parties or adverse counsel, as well as from the lawyer's clients." Id.
77

Id.
78Id.
79
"If it is the court's task to acknowledge the competing considerations at issue, and
if it is the advocate's task to anticipate the court's task and to help in its performance,
then the advocate has to acknowledge and address the competing considerations."
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Arguing the Law: The Advocate's Duty and Opportunity,16 GA. L.
REV. 821, 830 (1982).
8

OWhile the public's rights in private beaches are not co-extensive with
the rights enjoyed in municipal beaches, private landowners may not
in all instances prevent the public from exercising its right under the
public trust doctrine. The public must be afforded reasonable access
to the foreshore as well as a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand.
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 471 A.2d 355, 365-66 (1984).
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IV. THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL AND RULE 3.3(A)(3)
The adversarial legal system takes for granted that all material facts and law
will be presented to the tribunal by interested parties. The tribunal, a neutral
decision-maker, then digests both facts and law and renders a decision on the
merits. The theory is that if a "right" or "fair" process exists, a "right" or "fair"
81
outcome is virtually a foregone conclusion.
Such logic rests on unstable ground since the adversarial model relies on a
number of questionable premises. First, the adversary system assumes that the
best basis for determining what is "right" or "fair" for a particular dispute is
information presented by the parties-those persons who have most at stake
in the outcome of the litigation.82 Second, since the adversary system is only
as reliable and credible as its players, the adversary system presumes that the
lawyers on both sides are equally skilled at shaping and delivering legal
argument to the tribunal. 83 The adversary system gambles that the parties
come to court with roughly equal resources or at least enough to give the
impression that the tribunal has access to all of the information while it
deliberates. 84
In the end, Rule 3.3(a)(3) may well be the drafters' way of hedging their bets
on whether the foregoing articles of faith frame a candid picture of the legal
system. First, by forcing advocates to disclose authority that discredits their
clients' positions, the Rule assumes that, absent incentive or direction from the
85
MRPC, the parties are unlikely to disclose adverse legal authority. Most
attorneys measure success by a court's decision in their client's favor. That goal,
not to mention the intense pressure lawyers feel in courting clients and the stake
that lawyers have in their reputation in the community, make it vital that
lawyers paint their cases in a light most favorable to their clients. 86 Of course,
Rule 3.3(a)(3)'s disclosure duty still leaves room for the attorney to steadfastly

81

See, Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND.
L.J. 301 (1989).
82
1d. at 316-18.
83

Judith Resnick, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedurein Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494 (1986) ("proponents of [lawyer-based adversarialism] must posit that the disputants
are rational, competent actors who make deliberate decisions calculated to enhance their
positions").
84
1d. "[Piroponents [of lawyer-based adversarialism] must assume that the
disputants have access to resources (in terms of dollars and of power) which in turn
enable the generation of information and which give the disputants the opportunity to
exercise choices among competing options." Id.
85
Marvin E. Frankel, The Search For Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031,
1037 (1975) ("Employed by interested parties, the process often achieves truth only as a
convenience, a byproduct, or an accidental approximation.").
86
1d. ("The business of the advocate, simply stated, is to win if possible without
violating the law.").
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carry her client's banner. The Rule merely insists that an attorney not only play
hard but also play fair.
Second, Rule 3.3(a)(3) raises the possibility that parties may not be equally
diligent when it comes to legal research that buttresses their clients' case. 8 7 The
Rule does not allow the client of a more skilled lawyer to benefit from the failure
of opposing counsel to locate legal authority that supports opposing counsel's
client. However, the Rule does not wholly level the legal playing field. It merely
sets broad ground rules for the contest between the advocates. Rule 3.3(a)(3)
effectively commands that each side follow all the rules and not just the ones
that redound to her benefit. The attorney gains an edge not only by selectively
following the rules, but also by skillfully playing the rules.
Admittedly, to some extent, Rule 3.3(a)(3) takes into account wide variance
in the financial shape of parties. 88 An inequality of financial resources may at
times skew the outcome of a legal action. Cases are filed everyday in which the
plaintiff is an individual of average means, while the defendant corporation,
for example, comes laden with deep pockets, easily able to pay far more for
legal representation than the plaintiff. Rule 3.3(a)(3) offsets somewhat the edge
that money can buy by forcing the corporation to report damaging legal
authority.
V.

RESOLUTION

Rule 3.3(a)(3) may, on its face, pose a dilemma for the attorney intent upon
reconciling her roles as a representative of clients, as an officer of the legal
system and as a private citizen burdened with a special responsibility for the
quality of justice. In most cases, however, the Rule does not raise a real conflict
and allows the attorney to amicably reconcile her three roles.
Rule 3.3(a)(3) in no way erodes the attorney's role as a representative of her
clients. By insisting that the attorney disclose adverse legal authority to the
tribunal, the Rule does not force the attorney to breach any duty owed to her
client. The Rule does not spell out how the attorney is to present the legal
authority, only that she shall not knowingly fail to disclose. Above all, the Rule
does not force the attorney to make her opponent's legal arguments. 89 The Rule
leaves room for an advocate to distinguish the case at bar from the damaging
legal authority.90 Furthermore, the Rule leaves the advocate free to take issue

87

See generallyFrankel, supra note 78.

88

Simon, supra note 51, at 1085 ("Lawyers for relatively wealthy clients may invoke
procedures in order to impose prohibitive expense on relatively poor ones, and publicly
subsidized lawyers for poor clients may engage in tactics that impose expenses on
opposing parties required to pay for their counsel.").
89

Hazard, supra note 72, at 830 ("Moreover, the advocate should suggest a means of
resolving the conflict that maximizes the chance of prevailing for his client.").

90ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 280 (1949).
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with the adverse legal authority.91 In fact, the advocate's duty to disclose may
92
be satisfied by prefacing a cite with a well-placed "but see" or "contra."
A proposed earlier version of the Rule would have vastly expanded the scope
of the duty: "if a lawyer discovers that the tribunal has not been apprised of
legal authority known to the lawyer that would probably have a substantial
effect on the determination of a material issue, the lawyer shall advise the
tribunal of that authority."93 This version of the disclosure rule would have
burdened advocates with a duty that seemed at odds with the lawyer's role as
a client's advocate and was shelved for that reason. This version would have
forced an attorney to disclose any legal authority that the attorney stumbled
upon that the court could have found material.
The current Rule confirms the obligations an attorney owes to the legal
system. A party should prevail in a case wholly on the strength of the merits.
One side should not prevail because the court is blind with regard to binding
authority. It is fundamental that an attorney may not defraud the court or take
advantage of its ignorance under any circumstances. 94 The Rule leaves plenty
of room for the attorney to fulfill her duty to the public by ensuring that court
decisions reflect the true state of the law, and not the skill of the advocate or
the financial resources of the client.
Nor does the Rule unduly burden the advocate. It only governs legal
authority known to the advocate. Specifically, an attorney violates the rule only
when she shields binding legal authority she comes across. No ethical breach
lies if the attorney is unaware of the adverse legal authority.95
Under the American adversarial system, success is not always the
counterpoint of justice. Success is crudely measured by wins and losses, plain
and simple. On a loftier plane, justice is served when the tribunal reaches the
right result for the right reasons. This occurs when the tribunal renders its
decision on the strength of all of the facts and law brought to bear in the dispute
between the parties. Only a victory on the merits and by the rules is a victory
worthy of the name. 96 Safeguards such as those embodied in Rule 3.3(a)(3) are
in place to protect the integrity of the legal system.
91

1d.

92

"But see" means that the "cited authority clearly supportsa propositioncontraryto the

main proposition." "Contra"means that the "cited authority directly states the contrary of
the proposition." THE BLUEBOOK A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 23 (15th ed., 1991)

(emphasis in original).
93
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 3.1(c) (Discussion Draft Jan. 30,
1980).
941 use the terms "defraud" and "take advantage of' because the Rule only requires
disclosure of legal authority that the lawyer is aware of, yet chooses not to reveal.

95But see, supra note 18-19 and accompanying text.
96
1n civil cases, if I am satisfied from the evidence that the fact is against
my client, he must excuse me if I do not see as he does, and do not
press it: and should the principle also be wholly at variance with
sound law, it would be dishonorable folly in me to endeavor to incorPublished by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995

15

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:303

Rule 3.1's ban against filing legal actions without merit,97 and Rule 11
sanctions for frivolous lawsuits98 support this conclusion. In the end, the
question lingers-when an advocate is aware of legal authority that is
damaging to her client, is the client's representation compromised when the
advocate discloses it to the tribunal? The answer, in light of Rule 3.3(a)(3) is
that only by ensuring that the tribunal has all the legal tools to do its job can a
lawyer ethically represent her client within the parameters of the adversarial
system. Hiding the law is risky business. Although faced with damaging
authority, the ethical attorney must bare all to the court, and rely on the strength
of her argument to carry the day.
The fundamental issue is how far Rule 3.3(a)(3) should reach. For reasons
mentioned above,99 the proposed version of the Rule severely hampered the
attorney's ability to comply with her duty of zealous representation, because
it required the advocate to disclose any possible damaging law that she
discovered. On the other hand, the current version of the Rule fails to protect
adequately the proper functioning of the system because its scope is so limited.
The current version uses the term "legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction" as opposed to "legal authority.., that would probably have a
substantial effect on the determination of a material issue" which the proposed
version suggested. Thus, the current rule can be circumvented by the advocate
creatively distinguishing her case from the found law. In order to both protect
the legal system and to ensure that the lawyer's ability to represent her client
zealously remains sacrosanct, the comment to the Rule should advise lawyers
that the Rule, although limited to the jurisdiction, is intended to be interpreted
broadly.

porate it into the jurisprudence of the country, when, if successful, it

would be a gangrene that might bring death to my cause of the
succeeding day.

Simon supra note 51, at 1134 (quoting DANIEL HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 775

(2d ed. 1836)(emphasis in original).
97

The Rule provides in part: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983).
98

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads in part: The signature of an

attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read that, to the best of

his "knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry," the pleading,
motion, or other paper, is well grounded in fact and is "warranted by existing law or a
nonfrivolus argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law," and
that "it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
99

See discussion suprapage 20.
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